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I. INTRODUCTION
The questions are simple. Do you want to better protect the
property rights of private citizens in Louisiana? Do you want to make
sure government can no longer take your home for industrial
development purposes? Do you want to ensure those protections in our
state constitution? ... Voters in Louisiana have an opportunity to take
an important step to ensure property-rights protections in the
expropriation debate. I urge them to step up and act. It is act now or
leave the expropriation issue to be decided by the courts or future
unknown legislation. Do you really want to risk that?
Senator Joe McPherson1
Louisiana Senate District 29
During Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, thousands of Gulf Coast
residents lost their homes, their possessions, their savings, and some,
their lives. Those states hit hardest by the hurricanes have struggled
to recover. In places like New Orleans, where hundreds of thousands
of residents evacuated and may never return, uncertainty regarding
the future of private property has become a fact of life. As the excerpt
from Senator McPherson's letter indicates, arguably the single most
critical question facing local and state governments trying to rebuild
the devastated coast is how to encourage use of abandoned properties
to spark the economy.
Michael A. Heller explores this question in an article that
analyzes historical situations in which property has gone underused
for long periods of time. 2 American property law supports an owner's
right to subdivide ownership in her property. According to Heller,
however, beneath this seemingly free ability to divide ownership lies a
subtle property law doctrine that prevents and abolishes excessive
1. Joe McPherson, Letter to the Editor, Pass Amendment on Property Rights, ADVOCATE
(Baton Rouge), Sept. 28, 2006, at B10.
2. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).
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fragmentation and thus ensures that owners have the ability to put
property to its most productive use.3 Heller elaborated on these
general anti-fragmentation ideas with a theory he called the "tragedy
of the anticommons. 4
The tragedy of the anticommons is often described by
comparison to the tragedy of the commons.5 In a commons, "multiple
owners are each endowed with the privilege to use a given resource,
and no one has the right to exclude another."6 When a commons is
created, the given resource is prone to overuse because all parties
have unlimited access to it.7 Anticommons property represents the
mirror image of commons property; it is "a property regime in which
multiple owners hold effective rights of exclusion in a scarce
resource."8 In an anticommons, the given resource is prone to under-
use because owners typically exercise their exclusionary rights and
prevent others from using the land.9 The so-called tragedy of the
anticommons occurs when the resource is under-consumed relative to
the social optimum.10  Overcoming an existing tragedy of the
anticommons requires bundling property rights, through either
government or markets, into the hands of a smaller number of parties
who will not prevent one another from using the property.'
Heller's theory deserves more attention in light of recent
developments in constitutional law and the unique challenges facing
governments and property owners in Louisiana after Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita. In 2005, the Supreme Court released a
controversial opinion in Kelo v. City of New London that arguably
extended the government's already broad authority to take private
property under its eminent domain power provided by the Fifth
Amendment.' 2 The majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens,
3. Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1165 (1999)
("Hidden within the law, however, is a boundary principle that limits the right to subdivide
private property into wasteful fragments.").
4. Id. at 1170-72.
5. Heller, supra note 2, at 622. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 168 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968) (introducing the concept of the "tragedy of the
commons").
6. Heller, supra note 2, at 622.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 668.
9. Id. at 624.
10. Id. at 677.
11. Id. at 640.
12. 545 U.S. 469 (2005); see U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken
for public use, without just compensation."). Kelo remains the authoritative case on eminent
domain, as the Court recently denied a petition for writ of certiorari in another takings clause
case. Didden v. Village of Port Chester, 173 F. App'x 931 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
1127 (2007). For a general discussion of eminent domain, see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 562 (8th
20071 1601
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
defined "public use" to allow governments to take property from
individuals and sell it to private owners who intend to build hotels,
restaurants, and retail and office space on the property. 13 Claiming
that the Court had long rejected a literal definition of "public use," the
majority suggested that a taking for any "public purpose" satisfies the
Fifth Amendment. 14 In dissent, Justice O'Connor claimed that Kelo
eviscerated constitutional protections by permitting a government to
take property and transfer it to another private owner so long as that
government thought that the second owner would put it to a use more
beneficial to the community.15
Fearing that Kelo gave state and local governments too much
discretion to take property whenever they so desired, Louisiana
passed an amendment to its state constitution that prohibited
governments from taking property "for predominant use by any
private person or entity" or "for transfer of ownership to any private
person or entity" in the fall of 2006.16 Although the amendment
provides some exceptions to the aforementioned rule, it is clearly "part
of a national backlash against the outrageous Kelo decision."
17
Louisiana was the first of thirteen states in the fall of 2006 to vote on
an amendment to its state constitution that would limit a
government's ability to use eminent domain to take property purely
for the purpose of economic development,' 8 just as had been
contemplated in areas of New Orleans such as the Ninth Ward.19 As of
January 2007, thirty-four states had passed legislation similar to
Louisiana's amendment.
20
The Louisiana amendment passed by a much smaller margin
than many expected, with fifty-five percent voting in favor and forty-
five percent opposed. 21 Some believe that the vote was close, not
because voters opposed limiting the government's eminent domain
ed. 2004), which defines eminent domain (also called "condemnation" or "expropriation") as "[tihe
inherent power of a governmental entity to take privately owned property ... and convert it to
public use, subject to reasonable compensation for the taking."
13. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 474, 480-86.
14. Id. at 480.
15. Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
16. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4 (amended 2006).
17. John Kramer & Lisa Knepper, Louisiana Ratifies Eminent Domain Reform, CASTLE
COALITION, Oct. 4, 2006, http://www.castlecoalition.org/media/releases/104_06pr.html.
18. Id.; Mark Ballard, Property Proposal's Supporters Claim Radio Turned Tide, ADVOCATE
(Baton Rouge), Oct. 2, 2006, at A4-.
19. Shaheen Pasha, Property Grabs and the Gulf, CNNMONEY, Oct. 5, 2005,
http://money.cnn.com/2005/10/05/news/economy/eminentdomainkatrinaindex.htm.
20. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Decline to Take Up New Eminent Domain Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 2007, at A16.
21. Ballard, supra note 18.
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powers, but out of fear that the proposed amendment's convoluted
language would actually expand the government's ability to take
property.
22
This note analyzes how both Kelo and the Louisiana
constitutional amendment relate to Heller's theory of the tragedy of
the anticommons and explains why Heller's proffered solutions are not
the answer for New Orleans, where the underuse of abandoned
private property has inhibited the city's recovery from Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita. Part II provides a detailed explanation of Heller's
theory, the Kelo decision, and the Louisiana amendment. Part III
clarifies why parts of post-Katrina and Rita New Orleans meet
Heller's definition of an anticommons and proposes that Kelo offered
the government an opportunity to overcome the tragedy. It then
evaluates the Louisiana amendment from Heller's perspective to
explain why it will likely hinder economic development in New
Orleans and identifies some of the shortcomings of Heller's theory so
as to explain the passage of the amendment. Part IV proposes
alternative options for governments that want to encourage the use of
property without employing the authority granted by Kelo.
Importantly, unlike Kelo, the solutions offered in Part IV do not grant
governments the authority to force citizens out of their homes against
their will; instead, they provide the government with a means to
enable individuals to overcome the tragedy by attacking the
transaction costs that individuals typically encounter in trying to
consolidate rights by themselves.
II. BACKGROUND
Before analyzing the specific property issues associated with
rebuilding New Orleans, one must fully understand the three
principal sources undergirding this Note's analysis: Heller's article, in
which he explains the tragedy of the anticommons, 23 the Kelo
opinions, 24 and the Louisiana constitutional amendment passed in
response to Kelo.25 This Section provides a detailed description of each.
22. See id. (describing campaign by attorney Paul Loy Hurd of Monroe in the three weeks
preceding the vote as aimed at convincing Louisianans that the amendment was a "Trojan
Horse" that would expand the government's eminent domain powers because of its vague
language).
23. Heller, supra note 2.
24. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
25. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4 (amended 2006).
2007] 1603
1604 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:5:1599
A. Heller's Theory: The Tragedy of the Anticommons
Heller's theory of the anticommons has been cited as one of the
principal justifications for takings by governments under the Fifth
Amendment.26 After describing the principles behind his theory, this
Note presents examples of real-world anticommons property to clarify
Heller's ideas and provide points of comparison for the current
situation in New Orleans. The list of examples in this section is
illustrative, but not exhaustive. 27
1. Heller's Definition of an Anticommons and His Hypothesis
Heller frames his tragedy of the anticommons theory as a foil
to the tragedy of the commons.28 In a commons, "multiple owners are
each endowed with the privilege to use a given resource, and no one
has the right to exclude another.'' 29 When a commons is created, the
given resource is prone to overuse; examples include depleted fisheries
and overgrazed fields. 30 The mirror image of commons property,
anticommons property is a regime in which multiple owners hold
effective rights of exclusion in a scarce resource.31 Unlike the previous
attempts to define an anticommons, Heller's definition recognizes that
significant exclusion often has the same detrimental effects on society
as does total exclusion. 32 According to Heller:
A tragedy of the anticommons can occur when too many individuals have rights of
exclusion in a scarce resource. The tragedy is that rational individuals, acting
26. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 531, 533 n.4 (citing Heller's article as one of "[a] number of recent articles [that has] been
distinguished by their excellence and the importance of their contributions to the revival of
property").
27. Heller, supra note 2, at 682-86 (including as examples, in addition to those mentioned
later in this section, the Quaker Oats Big Inch Land Giveaway and Fractionation of Native
American Allotted Lands); see also Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 700 (1998) (also
including patent and copyright as potential examples).
28. For a general discussion of the tragedy of the commons, see Hardin, supra note 5.
29. Heller, supra note 2, at 622.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 668; see Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (asserting that
the right to exclude others is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property"); Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions
as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 22-23 (1913) (characterizing property as legal
relations between and among legal subjects); Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L.
REV. 1053, 1055-56 (1989) (noting that the concept of property has changed from a theory of
"thing ownership" to that of a "bundle of sticks").
32. See Heller, supra note 2, at 667-69 (explaining that the previous definitions of
Michelman, Dukeminier, and Krier, which claimed an anticommons existed only when all
owners possessed rights to exclude all others, prevented those scholars from identifying a real-
world anticommons).
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separately, may collectively waste the resource by underconsuming it compared with a
social optimum.
3 3
Because any individual has the power to exclude all others
from the property in an anticommons, putting that property to use
requires unanimous consent among owners. Such unanimity usually
proves difficult to attain; thus, resources either go under-used or go to
waste entirely.34 In modern society, transaction costs and other factors
make it less likely that parties will acquire the exclusionary rights of
others; as a result, the tragedy of the anticommons is difficult for both
individuals and governments to overcome. 35 The next section of this
Note explores overcoming the tragedy in greater detail.
Perhaps Heller's description of the Moscow storefront best
exemplifies the tragedy of the anticommons. Many Moscow storefronts
remain unoccupied years after the Soviet Union's collapse. 36 Under the
socialist regime, all property belonged to "the people as a whole," and
as such, socialist law did not delineate physical and legal boundaries
of private property.37 Although storefronts were privatized after the
Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, and the transition to
markets began, most remain empty.
38
Heller explains this phenomenon by characterizing the
storefronts as anticommons property-property in which multiple
owners hold rights of exclusion in a scarce resource. 39 During the
process of privatization in Russia, the new legal regime ratified some
existing socialist and informal use rights while superimposing a new
set of market ownership rights.40 Put simply, these stores remained
empty because during this transition different parties, including local,
regional, and federal authorities, as well as private citizens, gained
the right to exclude one another from the same piece of property. 41
Because more than one individual possessed exclusionary rights, any
potential use of the storefront required the unanimous consent of
numerous parties. In practice, obtaining such consent proved virtually
impossible because, in the rare instances where the parties could be
33. Id. at 677.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 625-26 ("Neither [a commons nor an anticommons] would be tragic in a
theoretical world of costless transactions, because people could trade their initial endowments
until resources were put to their highest-valued uses. . . [In practice], however, efficient
bargains fail because transaction costs, strategic behaviors, and cognitive biases defeat informal
negotiations, and communities of owners are not close-knit.").
36. Id. at 622-23.
37. Id. at 629.
38. Id. at 633.
39. Id. at 623.
40. Id. at 637.
41. Id. at 635-38.
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congregated, each party thought it could put the property to its most
productive use.42 Thus, disagreement among owners prevented
property use and the tragedy of the anticommons occurred in the
storefronts.
43
Post-earthquake Kobe, Japan also exemplifies the tragedy of
the anticommons. Reconstruction of Kobe has proven difficult because,
in the mid-20th century, the Japanese government created an
anticommons regime by subdividing property to the point where a
building could be placed on a plot that consisted of dozens of smaller
parcels, each about the size of a "U.S. garage." 44 Seventy percent of
Kobe's buildings have not been rebuilt since an earthquake destroyed
the city in 1995 because rebuilding requires the cooperation of several
landowners and such cooperation does not exist.
45
2. Overcoming the Tragedy
According to Heller, "avoid[ing] anticommons property is one
element that may determine whether countries progress to First
World prosperity or spiral downward to Third World despond. '46 So
how does a society avoid creating an anticommons? For newly formed
societies or newly inhabited properties, Heller argues that useable
private property emerges less successfully from resources that begin
with divided ownership than from resources that begin with a single
owner holding the traditional bundle of legal rights.47 However, the
word "begin" limits the hypothesis's usefulness in solving modern
crises in our country; most properties have experienced some form of
ownership for hundreds of years. In other words, this opportunity to
"start" with bundled land and rights has already been lost.
More interesting is the issue pertinent to rebuilding New
Orleans: how best to overcome a tragedy of the anticommons once it
exists. Heller leaves that question mostly unresolved by explaining
what needs to happen without offering a viable solution. He explains
that to overcome an existing anticommons, a society must transition
to a private property regime that better aligns each owner's interest
with efficient use by forcing the private property owner to face the full
42. Id. at 639.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 684-85.
45. See id. ("In one block of Kobe, over 300 renters, lessees, landowners, and subletters own
often-overlapping claims, and each one must agree before rebuilding can go forward. ...
[S]everal years after the Kobe earthquake, seven out of ten buildings remain damaged or in
rubble; rebuilding plans are set, but are blocked by owners.").
46. Id. at 659.
47. Id. at 631.
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cost of underconsumption. 48 This transition occurs by consolidating
rights into a useable bundle in the hands of a single owner.
49
In theory, such a consolidation of rights can occur through
markets or through governments. 50 By the market route, a property
bundler acquires each right from its current holder either legally or
illegally, by means such as purchasing. 51 By the government route,
governments intervene to redefine and reallocate property rights
among individuals by means such as expropriation.
5 2
In practice, transitioning to a society in which one owner faces
the full cost of underconsumption is difficult. Anticommons property
would not be tragic in a world of costless transactions because
individuals would trade their initial endowments until resources were
in the hands of those who would put them to their highest-valued
use. 53 The market route fails in the real world, however, because
individuals bargaining for the exchange of resources act inefficiently
as a result of transaction costs, strategic behaviors, and cognitive
biases.5 4 Similarly, governments struggle to overcome the tragedy
because it is difficult to calculate compensation and they fear
demoralizing potential investors. 55 Heller concludes his description of
the anticommons by posing the ultimate question that this Note hopes
to answer: "What is to be done?"
56
Heller applies his theories of how a society can overcome the
tragedy of the anticommons to his Moscow storefront example.
57
Converting the storefront from anticommons to useable private
property requires transitioning from multiple owners, each exercising
a right of exclusion, to a sole decision-maker, who controlls an entire
bundle of rights.58 To have useable private property in a storefront, "a
48. Id. at 678.
49. Id. at 640.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 640-41 ("In a legal transaction, a property bundler would buy each right from its
holder through formal, enforceable contracts. In the storefront example.., negotiations may
only be possible through informal or corrupt channels. Over time, these corrupt channels can be
routinized and may replace legal transactions.").
52. Id. at 641.
53. Id. at 625.
54. Id. at 625-26.
55. Id. at 679.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 641; see also Christopher Stadnick, Standard Setting Organizations: Answer to
the Tragedy of the Anticommons? 4-5 (Nov. 12, 2002) (unpublished paper), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/pwagner/ideas/stadnick-paper.pdf (applying Heller's theories to
the semiconductor industry: noting that under certain circumstances industry standard setting
can be a solution to the anticommons tragedy and indicating the ability of the semiconductor
industry to reduce transaction costs and facilitate licensing).
58. Heller, supra note 2, at 640.
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sole owner must in principle be able to sell or lease the property,
receive the revenue from the sale or lease, occupy the premises, and
determine how a lessee may use the property."
59
In theory, markets or governments could overcome the tragedy
in Moscow by consolidating rights into one owner. 60 Heller explains
the market solution by contrasting the empty storefronts to the
flourishing metal kiosks established by entrepreneurs. 61 Unlike the
storefront operators, kiosk owners avoided the tragedy of the
anticommons by acquiring a full bundle of rights to their property
through bribery of government officials and the local mafia.62 This was
possible because the kiosk owners faced significantly fewer
transaction costs than the storeowners-they needed to bribe only a
limited number of officials and an easily identifiable criminal
organization. 63 The storefront owners, conversely, needed to bargain
with countless, likely unidentifiable, co-owners. 64 Lower transaction
costs are the primary reason that kiosk owners escaped the tragedy
while store owners did not.65
In addition to economic transaction costs, Heller explores the
problems created by history and culture. Although such problems
could affect a property regime anywhere, Heller analyzes their
consequences on the anticommons tragedy in Kobe, Japan. Kobe faces
more than economic transaction costs in trying to overcome its
tragedy; it also faces a set of historical and cultural constraints on
local government intervention. 66 Japanese authorities frequently
decline to seize property because of the nation's "preference for
harmony and consensus." 67 The Kobe example shows that overcoming
the tragedy often requires resolving more than economic issues.
Heller's examples illustrate that, no matter how a tragedy of
the anticommons came into existence, overcoming it proves difficult in
practice. In Moscow's storefronts and in Kobe's streets, the tragedy
lives on. Only in the kiosks did property owners overcome the tragedy
and put their property to its most efficient use. Distinguishing
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 633, 642-47.
62. Id. at 642-43.
63. Id. at 643.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 654-58 (claiming that the five factors affecting transaction costs-namely the
type of anticommons owner, the number of anticommons owners, the boundary of the
anticommons, the spatial or legal nature of the anticommons, and the starting point in
transition-are all at comparatively high levels among storefront owners).
66. Id. at 684-85.
67. Id. at 685 (quoting Jathon Sapsford, Building Blocked: Quake.Hobbled Kobe Shows How
Land Law Can Paralyze Japan, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 1996, at Al).
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between the examples in which the tragedy lingers and the one in
which it was overcome will be critical when assessing the current
situation in New Orleans.
B. Kelo v. City of New London: Allowing the Government to Address
the Tragedy
The Kelo decision, rendered in August 2005, conferred
significant power upon governments to take property by eminent
domain.68 This controversial decision, handed down just a month
before Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast, gave governments the
discretion to take private property and reassign it to an owner willing
and able to put it to its "socially optimal" use.
1. The Factual Background
In 2000, the city of New London, Connecticut approved a
development plan that it hoped would create more than 1,000 jobs,
increase tax revenues, and boost its struggling economy. 69 Reports
showed that New London was an "[economically] distressed
municipality," its unemployment rate was nearly double that of
Connecticut as a whole, and its population was at its lowest point
since 1920.70 After buying much of the property required for the plan
from willing sellers, the developer proposed that the government
complete the plan by assembling land from unwilling sellers through
eminent domain. 71 The city approved this proposal, allowing the New
London Development Corporation ("NLDC"), a nonprofit entity
established to plan economic development, to acquire property by
exercising eminent domain in the city's name. 7
2
The area on which the economic developments were to take
place included roughly 115 privately owned properties. 73 The nine
plaintiffs, also known as the "unwilling sellers," owned fifteen of the
115 parcels. 74 The plaintiffs' properties were condemned only because
they were situated in the development area-not because they were in
poor condition. 75 Once acquired, the NLDC planned to convert the
68. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 488-90 (2005).
69. Id. at 472.
70. Id. at 473; see also Avi Salzman, Homeowners Shown the Door, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2005,
at 14CN ("[T]he city is poor.... [It] was declared a 'distressed municipality' in 1990.").
71. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472.
72. Id. at 472-75.
73. Id. at 474.




properties into restaurants, shops, businesses, residences, and a
museum by leasing them to private developers in exchange for their
agreement to use the land according to the terms of the development
plan.76
2. Stevens' Majority Opinion
In the majority opinion, Justice Stevens stated that a
government cannot take property from one private party and give it to
another private party if the government's only reason for doing so is
the transfer itself; however, a government can mandate such a
transfer if it does so for future "use by the public."77 In looking at the
facts, Stevens first noted that the government did not take the
properties only to benefit the private parties to whom it intended to
transfer them.78 He admitted, however, that the intended future use of
these properties could not be considered "use by the public" because
they would not be entirely open to the public.
7 9
To resolve the tension between these observations, Stevens
concluded that the Court had abandoned the "use by the public" test in
favor of the more liberal "public purpose" test, which exudes deference
to local and state governments.80 The Court observed that "[tlhe City
has carefully formulated an economic development plan that it
believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community,
including.., new jobs and increased tax revenue."81 These benefits
constituted a "public purpose," and as such, the NLDC's taking of
private property under the city's eminent domain power did not
violate the Fifth Amendment.8 2 Noting that economic development is a
critical function of government and that the achievement of public
good often coincides with the benefit of private parties, the Court
76. Id. at 474, 476 n.4.
77. Id. at 477.
78. Id. at 477-78.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 479-80 ("[W]hen this Court began applying the Fifth Amendment to the States
at the close of the 19th century, it embraced the broader and more natural interpretation of
public use as 'public purpose.'" (citing Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158-64
(1896))); see also Michael McKnight, Don't Know What the Slide Rule is For: The Need for a
Precise Definition of Public Purpose in North Carolina in the Wake of Kelo v. City of New
London, 28 CAMPBELL L. REV. 291, 305 (2006) ("The Court in Kelo rejected any judicial standard
or definition of [public purpose or public use] in favor of complete legislative discretion."); G.
David Mathues, Shadow of a Bulldozer?: RLUIPA and Eminent Domain After Kelo, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1653, 1695 (2006) ("Kelo did not open the door to a Brave New World of unlimited
eminent domain powers. At worst, it alerted the public to the breadth of an existing power. At
best, it affirmed settled precedent.").
81. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483.
82. Id. at 484.
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rejected the plaintiffs' argument that economic development did not




Justice O'Connor's dissent highlights the power that a liberal
reading of the majority opinion confers upon state and local
governments and, thus, Kelo's potential impact on the current
situation in New Orleans. O'Connor claims that, following Kelo:
Under the banner of economic development, all private property is now vulnerable to
being taken and transferred to another private owner, so long as it might be upgraded-
i.e., given to an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems more
beneficial to the public-in the process.
8 4
By claiming that the incidental public benefits that accompany
the governmentally mandated transfer of property between private
partes constitute a "public use," Justice O'Connor believed that the
majority eliminated the Taking Clause's protections altogether.8 5
Unlike previous cases where the Court upheld a private taking as
constitutional, New London's takings did not directly achieve a public
benefit because the plaintiffs' well-maintained homes did not cause
any social harm.86 Theoretically, under the majority opinion, a
government could take any single-family dwelling and install a high-
rise apartment complex in its place.87 Indeed, virtually any use of real
private property generates some incidental benefit to the public.
88
Justice O'Connor, like many other commentators, concluded that "the
government now has license to transfer property from those with
fewer resources to those with more.
'8 9
83. Id. at 484-85, 486 n.14.
84. Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
85. Id.; see Peter M. Agnetti, Are You Still Master of Your Domain? Abuses of Economic
Development Takings, and Michigan's Return to "Public Use" in County of Wayne v. Hathcock,
79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1259, 1261 (2005) ("As a result of Kelo, the states, through their own
constitutional or statutory restraints, are now the sole protectors of private property owners from
the threat of eminent domain exercised upon the rationale of economic development."); Haley W.
Burton, Case Note, Not So Fast: The Supreme Court's Overly Broad Public Use Ruling Condemns
Private Property Rights with Surprising Results, 6 WYO. L REV. 255, 285 (2006) ("Kelo violated
the property rights the government is meant to protect and gave the government nearly
unlimited freedom of condemnation.").
86. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 519 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)).
87. See id. at 501 ("[I]f predicted... positive side effects are enough to render transfer from
one private party to another constitutional, then the words 'for public use' do not realistically
exclude any takings, and thus do not exert any constraint on the eminent domain power.").
88. Id.
89. Id. at 505; see Kate Moran, Amendment Limits Use of Expropriation Powers; Property
Couldn't Be Taken for Developers, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Sept. 27, 2006, at 1 ("The
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C. Louisiana's Response: Act No. 851
In response to Kelo, Louisiana passed Act No. 851, an
amendment to its state constitution, in the fall of 2006.90 The
amendment, an obvious attempt to cabin the wide authority granted
by Kelo,9' states that "property shall not be taken ... by the state or
its political subdivisions: (a) for predominant use by any private
person or entity; or (b) for transfer of ownership to any private person
or entity."92 This language alone prohibits a sovereign from doing
exactly what the local government did in Kelo. The amendment goes
further, though, and expressly defines "public purpose" as used in § 4
of the Louisiana Constitution, which mirrors the Fifth Amendment to
the federal Constitution. 93 Louisiana's new definition of public purpose
tracks the "public use" definition that Justice Stevens claimed was
outdated, as the amendment limits public purpose to use for:
(a) A general public right to a definite use of the property.
(b) Continuous public ownership of property dedicated to one or more of the following
objectives and uses:
(i) Public buildings in which publicly funded services are administered, rendered, or
provided.
(ii) Roads, bridges, waterways, access to public waters and lands, and other public
transportation, access, and navigational systems available to the general public.
(iii) Drainage, flood control, levees, coastal and navigational protection and reclamation
for the benefit of the public generally.
(iv) Parks, convention centers, museums, historical buildings and recreational facilities
generally open to the public.
(v) Public utilities for the benefit of the public generally.
(vi) Public ports and public airports to facilitate the transport of goods or persons in
domestic or international commerce.
(c) The removal of a threat to public health or safety caused by the existing use or disuse
of the property.
9 4
Kelo ruling provoked a frenzy among property-rights advocates, who labeled it a watershed that
left every homeowner vulnerable to the depredations of deep-pocketed developers."); John Riley,
Land War Goes to High Court; Justices to Decide on Property Rights vs. Economic Development
Issue, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), May 15, 2005, at 6A (quoting petitioner Kelo as saying, "It has
been a class issue from the start-we're uneducated and poor, and it's OK to do that to the
poor.").
90. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4 (amended 2006).
91. See Letter to Editor, We Support Amendment 5, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Sept. 20,
2006, at B6 ("The proposed amendment... was written in response to the Kelo decision . .
92. LA. CONST. art. II, § 4 (amended 2006).
93. U.S. CONST. amend. V; LA. CONST. art. I, § 4 (amended 2006).
94. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4 (amended 2006); Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479.
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In a final attempt to limit the effects of Kelo in Louisiana, the
amendment clarifies that "[n]either economic development,
enhancement of tax revenue, or [sic] any incidental benefit to the
public shall be considered in determining whether the taking or
damaging of property is for a public purpose . . ... 95 Importantly, the
specific arguments made by the New London government defending
its taking in Kelo included economic development, enhancement of tax
revenue, and other benefits that the dissent characterized as
incidental.9 6 The following section will show that, by responding in
such a way to Kelo, Louisianans eliminated the possibility of
government intervention to help New Orleans overcome its own
tragedy of the anticommons.
III. ANALYSIS
This section explores and synthesizes the relationships among
the previously described anticommons theory, the Kelo case, and the
Louisiana constitutional amendment and applies them to the post-
hurricanes situation in New Orleans. More specifically, this section
first explains why portions of New Orleans qualify as anticommons
property. It then describes potential solutions to the city's tragedy
contemplated by Heller himself, including the outcome of Kelo.
Finally, it clarifies the situation in Louisiana as it stands after the
constitutional amendment.
A. New Orleans as Anticommons Property
Although there are notable differences between Heller's
anticommons examples and the New Orleans situation, the basic
circumstances are the same. This section explains why parts of New
Orleans meet Heller's definition of anticommons property and then
describes the uniqueness of the New Orleans situation, which in some
ways clarifies Heller's basic framework.
1. New Orleans fits Heller's Basic Definition of Anticommons Property
Parts of New Orleans qualify as anticommons property under
Heller's basic definition: a property regime in which multiple owners
hold effective rights of exclusion in a scarce resource, causing the
resource to be "underconsum[ed as] compared to the social
95. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4 (amended 2006). The amendment makes other changes to § 4 of
the Louisiana Constitution that are less relevant to this article. Id.
96. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 501 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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optimum." 97 A survey conducted in the fall of 2006 showed that New
Orleans's population remains roughly sixty percent lower than its pre-
storm level.98 An estimated 454,863 people lived in the city before the
storm, whereas only 187,525 lived there in the fall of 2006. 99
Entrepreneurs have flocked to New Orleans to buy as much property
as they can while demand and prices are low.100 These individuals
hope to develop their acquired property, encourage rebirth in the city,
and sell after increasing the property's value.10 1 To promote this
activity, the government demolished homes that were flooded beyond
repair, hoping that clearing the land would incentivize new building
thereon. 102 Nonetheless, redevelopment has been slow, at least in part
because those who have the right to exclude these entrepreneurs from
property have done so. Essentially, the immediate and unanticipated
exodus of long-time residents from the city left some neighborhoods
entirely vacant but still privately owned by former residents. 10 3 These
landowners, though absent, possess exclusionary rights and can
97. Heller, supra note 2, at 668, 677.
98. Adam Nossiter, New Orleans Population is Reduced Nearly 60%, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7,
2006, at A9.
99. Id.
100. See Karen Turni Bazile, Recovery Forum Held in St. Bernard: Residents Blast Lack of
Key Home Advice, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Feb. 24, 2006, at 1 (describing the St.
Bernard Citizens Recovery Committee's plan to encourage growth by buying out destroyed
homes and providing new house construction); Michelle Krupa, Corps Offers Buyouts in
Lakeview; Land Near Breach Used for Protection, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), May 28, 2006,
at 1 (describing the outrage of homeowners whose land the Army Corps of Engineers targeted to
buy and then use to provide more flood protection to the city); Allen Powell II, Condo Project in
the Works; Plan Also Features 204 Apartments, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Feb. 25, 2006,
at 1 (mentioning that Property One has accelerated its efforts to buy out Belle Promenade and
redevelop it because it expects the housing market to "boom in the near future"); Editorial,
Redevelopment by Default?, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), June 11, 2006, at 6 (discussing the
guidance needed by "people who've been bought out of flooded neighborhoods); Molly Reid,
Filling in the Spaces: Developers Hope to Jumpstart Neighborhood Recovery By Building Multiple
Homes, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), September 9, 2006, at 1 (claiming that the hope of
making a profit is the driving force behind individual bargain-seekers, developers, and
organizations who are buying up properties in New Orleans); Greg Thomas, Home Prices Take
Off After Katrina; Average Prices Up 21% Throughout N.O. Area, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Feb. 19, 2006, at 1 (mentioning that investors are attempting to buy property that is
ripe for rebuilding).
101. Kathleen M. Howley, New Orleans House 'Flippers' Reap Profit, Spur City's Rebound,
June 22, 2006, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=lOOOOlO3&sid=aDJNcGOCW9rk
&refer=us (describing the thousands of homes in New Orleans that have already been "flipped,"
i.e., bought cheaply after being damaged by the storm, repaired, and resold for a profit).
102. Michelle Krupa & Coleman Warner, Across South, Displaced Chime In With Own Ideas
for Rebuilding N.O.; But Residents Hesitate On the Tough Calls, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), December 3, 2006, at 1 (describing the city's response to relocating those residents who
have been bought out of their flooded-out neighborhoods as unorganized and ineffective).
103. William Douglas & Chris Adams, President Accepts Blame in Big Easy: Bush Praises the
City's Progress and Pleads for its Previous Residents to Return, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 30,
2006, at A10.
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prevent entrepreneurs from buying their subplots and converting
them into revenue-generating structures such as hotels, restaurants,
and low-income housing.
Many neighborhoods in New Orleans meet Heller's definition of
anticommons property because one property owner, often an evacuee,
uses her exclusionary rights to prevent the entrepreneur who holds
rights to the surrounding land from obtaining rights to the entire
parcel and using the land to its full potential. 10 4 Similarly, just as
evacuees prevent entrepreneurs from using the land, entrepreneurs
exclude others from using the property by holding onto their
accumulations in the hope of initiating a larger project once they
secure the remaining parcels. As such, multiple owners, namely
evacuees and entrepreneurs, possess exclusionary rights in the large
parcel and prevent the use of the property.
In many respects, the situation in New Orleans is analogous to
that in Kobe, Japan, where developers have not been able to obtain
large enough parcels to use the property as they would like. Although
the situation in Kobe involves smaller parcels than those at issue in
New Orleans, the basic scenario is the same: owners exercise
exclusionary rights to prevent others from using property, a scarce
resource. 105
Unlike in Heller's various examples in which the excluder
exercised her rights because of express disagreement over how
property should be used, the primary excluding property owner in
New Orleans often uses this exclusionary right passively and
sometimes unknowingly. Often the owner has relocated to a different
city with no plans as to when or whether to return. Thus, a property
owner who no longer lives in New Orleans and may never return can
hamper the city's redevelopment and economic progress by being
unavailable to sell, or agree to a use of, property. Hoping to gain
control of the larger plot and initiate a grander money-making project,
the party who owns the surrounding land must leave the already
104. See Reid, supra note 100.
105. In some areas of New Orleans, plots are large enough to go to some use, such as a single
residence, even if rights are not consolidated into an entrepreneur; in parts of New Orleans,
however, such as the Ninth Ward, large parcels remain entirely deserted just as the smaller
parcels did in Kobe. This note (and in particular its solutions) focuses on those deserted parcels
that have been abandoned by evacuees. This distinction between Kobe and New Orleans is
critical to analyzing the viability of the tax solutions offered later in this note. See infra text
accompanying notes 146-50. While tax cuts or hikes would have no effect in Kobe because no
owner has a large enough parcel to act unilaterally, that is not the case in New Orleans, where a
scenario in which the law incentivizes multiple individuals to build on their smaller parcels




acquired land undeveloped. 106 If a single owner could obtain a full
bundle of rights to the entire property, that owner could put the
property to its "socially optimal" use. Instead, several neighborhoods
and whole portions of the city remain entirely deserted, and a tragedy
of the anticommons persists.
2. Adapting Heller's Theory to Apply it to New Orleans
It is necessary to adapt Heller's definition of anticommons
property to apply it to New Orleans because the New Orleans
situation differs from his anticommons examples in three important
ways. First, the potential rights bundlers in New Orleans have no
rights in the smaller parcels currently owned by evacuees or holdouts.
In Moscow and Kobe, several parties already possessed various rights
in each of the smaller parcels going unused. In New Orleans, however,
the entrepreneurs have rights only in those surrounding parcels they
have already acquired. There is only one rights owner in the
properties the entrepreneurs must acquire to put the larger parcel to
its most efficient use. Therefore, the property in which multiple
owners hold exclusionary rights is the larger parcel that the
entrepreneur wants to buy, not the smaller, individual properties
constituting that parcel. In this larger parcel, multiple owners, namely
the entrepreneur and the evacuee, hold and exercise their
exclusionary rights and prevent property from being used efficiently.
Thus, although New Orleans is different from previous anticommons
situations, it fits Heller's basic definition of an anticommons.
Second, in New Orleans, unlike in Moscow and Kobe,
individuals possess rights in parcels large enough to be put to some
use even without the bundling of rights. It is possible for a holdout in
New Orleans to use her individual plot of land in a socially desirable,
if not socially optimal, way. In Moscow and Kobe, property goes wholly
unused in the absence of bundling. The New Orleans situation
nonetheless constitutes a tragedy of the anticommons because such an
owner exercises exclusionary rights in the larger parcel and prevents
an entrepreneur interested in constructing a revenue-generating
structure on the plot from putting property to its most efficient use.
Similarly, the entrepreneur excludes others from the larger plot in the
hope that she will eventually use it in its entirety.
Third, in New Orleans, unlike in Moscow or Kobe, there is no
clear majority view on how the property should be used; instead, the
anticommons pits one owner's interest against the interest of another
owner or owners. The New Orleans situation proves that an
106. See supra text accompanying note 104.
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anticommons can be tragic even in the absence of a "majority"
understanding of "socially optimal" use. In Heller's examples, the
majority of owners agree on a use for a piece of property, but a
minority prevents the majority from putting the property to the use it
desires.'0 7 Consider the Moscow storefronts, where several of the
owners, such as the local and national government, might have an
idea regarding the use of the storefront, but the individual owner of
the store might disagree. The individual storeowner, even if in the
minority, can block the majority from using the store as it desires.
This would surely qualify as "tragic" because underconsumption
occurs in the face of a widely desired use.108
Conversely, there is often no minority in New Orleans; instead,
an evacuee or a holdout prevents an entrepreneur from using the
property to its full potential. 0 9 This situation makes finding a
workable solution more difficult than it would be in most anticommons
situations because there is no "majority" for the law to favor. Taking a
Kelo-like approach, the law could regard society as a whole as the
majority, as it would like to see property put to its most economically
beneficial use to encourage growth in the struggling city. Even this
"society as a whole" approach is suspect, however, because putting the
property to its most economically beneficial use would require
ownership in the property to pass from one individual to another. This
would require individuals still living in or contemplating returning to
New Orleans, who have already endured indescribable hardship as a
result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, to part with their property that
survived the storms. It is at least arguable, based on the sanctity that
our nation has given to property rights throughout its history, the
inherently personal nature of property, and the irrationality of
property holders, 110 that society would not favor this result. Indeed, it
is little wonder that many property owners in New Orleans have
refused to sell their property to developers who promise to use it for
the benefit of society and equally unsurprising that such property
owners have faced little pressure from society to do so.'11 Importantly,
107. See generally Heller, supra note 2 (describing Moscow storefronts, the lands at issue in
the Quaker Oats Big Inch Land Giveaway, post-earthquake Kobe, Japan, and certain Native
American allotted lands as examples of the tragedy).
108. Id. at 639.
109. See supra text accompanying note 104.
110. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1484 (1998) (offering as an example of the
"endowment effect"-how much more highly someone values an item once they own it-the fact
that coffee mug owners on average demanded twice as much to sell a mug that they already
owned as they admitted being willing to pay to get the same mug from someone else).
111. In fact, the constitutional amendment passed in Louisiana actually removed all
pressure on citizens in such situations. See infra Part III.C.
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even though there is no clear majority and minority, the New Orleans
situation constitutes a tragedy of the anticommons because property is
under-used to the detriment of society as a result of multiple parties
exercising valid exclusionary rights.
B. Kelo as a Solution to New Orleans's Tragedy of the Anticommons
By giving the government latitude to seize property from
private citizens and ensure that such property is used in the public
interest, the Kelo decision offered a potential solution to the tragedy of
the anticommons in New Orleans.11 2 When Heller suggested that
governments provided a possible solution to such tragedies, he had a
Kelo-like scenario in mind.11 3 Under the authority granted by Kelo, the
government could take property from private individuals in New
Orleans and give it to developers because doing so would serve the
public purpose by rejuvenating the local economy. To many, including
those in Louisiana who favored the amendment to the state
constitution, this was a frightening prospect; it essentially gave the
government unlimited authority to take what belonged to someone if
doing so would benefit society. Under Heller's theory of the
anticommons, however, Kelo produced a result that Louisiana
residents should have embraced. Kelo provided governments with the
power to overcome the tragedy of the anticommons by consolidating
rights in the hands of a single individual who can put the property to
its socially optimal use. At least in the abstract, Kelo should have
enabled development in New Orleans, just as it did in New London,
Connecticut.
The factual similarities between Kelo and the current situation
in New Orleans are striking. As in New London, the New Orleans
economy is struggling and property could be put to a more
economically beneficial use if consolidated in the hands of a single
owner.11 4 Like the developers in Kelo, entrepreneurs in New Orleans
wait in the wings with plans to rejuvenate the area.11 5 Finally, as in
Kelo, a few individuals have prevented these entrepreneurs and
governments from achieving their goals by holding onto their
property.11 6 Importantly, in Kelo, the homeowners who refused to sell,
and consequently had their property seized under eminent domain,
lived on those parcels; in many of the areas at issue in New Orleans,
112. See supra Part I.
113. Heller, supra note 2, at 640-41.
114. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472-74 (2005).
115. Id. at 473-74.
116. Id. at 475.
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those landowners who have not sold to developers neither live on their
land nor plan to return to it.117
Given these factual similarities, it seems probable that, under
Kelo, a government could use eminent domain to overcome the tragedy
of the anticommons in New Orleans. Such takings would serve a
public purpose by generating economic development in struggling
areas of the city. So long as the government could show that it had
some plan for transferring the taken properties into the hands of
parties who could put them to a publicly beneficial use, the Fifth
Amendment would be satisfied, the rights could be consolidated into a
usable bundle for entrepreneurs, and the tragedy of the anticommons
would be overcome as they put the property to use. 118
C. The Current Situation in Louisiana
Heller proposed two possible solutions to an existing tragedy of
the anticommons: governments and markets.11 9 However, neither
governments nor markets acting alone can overcome the tragedy in
New Orleans. The amendment to the state constitution ended any
possibility that the government could involve itself directly in
consolidating property rights. Markets never provided a realistic
solution to the tragedy because, in a complex and mobile society where
multiple parties possess exclusionary rights in land parcels, high
transaction costs prevent efficient bargaining, which, in turn, prevents
the consolidation of rights into a usable bundle. The reality of post-
hurricane New Orleans ensures that neither of these solutions will
succeed independently.
1. Governments are No Longer a Solution to the Tragedy in Louisiana
The constitutional amendment adopted in Louisiana ended any
hope of government using Kelo-granted authority to consolidate
property rights into a usable bundle.12° The quick and dramatic
response of the Louisiana legislature and citizenry that eliminated
this possible solution to the tragedy would not surprise Heller in the
least; in fact, he predicted as much. He anticipated that governments
would experience difficulty in overcoming the tragedy because of "the
117. Id.
118. Id. at 483 (noting that the government's exercise of eminent domain in Kelo satisfies the
Fifth Amendment because "[tihe City has carefully formulated an economic development plan
that it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community, including.., new jobs and
increased tax revenue").
119. Heller, supra note 2, at 640.
120. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4 (amended 2006).
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cost and administrative complexity of compensation and the fear of
demoralizing potential investors by reforming property rights without
compensation." 121
While Heller accurately predicted that government
intervention would not succeed in solving the tragedy of the
anticommons because of public resistance, 122 his assumption that
property owners would act rationally 123 caused him to overlook a
major reason for that resistance. Heller focused on compensation and
future investors while ignoring the primary reason that people resist
government use of eminent domain: the so-called "endowment effect."
The endowment effect occurs when sellers demand higher prices than
they would be willing to pay to purchase the same item from someone
else.
1 24
Compensation is always an issue with government takings;
however, the problem is especially complicated in New Orleans. With
the endowment effect in mind, it is unlikely that landowners in New
Orleans would willingly allow the government to take control of their
property even in exchange for outrageously high compensation. The
people of New Orleans have already lost so much because of the storm
that they would likely refuse to give anything they can still call their
own to the government, especially because many blame the
government for bungling the post-hurricane relief efforts.125 Similarly,
those observing this situation from outside of New Orleans likely fear
granting the government such broad eminent domain power because
of its potential future impact on their lives-a problem exacerbated by
the endowment effect. Put simply, the endowment effect transforms
property owners into irrational actors.
121. Heller, supra note 2, at 679.
122. "Once anticommons property is created, markets or governments may have difficulty in
assembling rights into usable bundles. After initial entitlements are set, institutions and
interests coalesce around them with the result that the path to private property may be blocked
and scarce resources may be wasted." Id. at 659.
123. '"The tragedy [of the anticommons] is that rational individuals, acting separately, may
collectively waste the resource by underconsuming it compared with a social optimum. Id. at 677.
124. Jolls et al., supra note 110, at 1484.
125. See David Brooks, Op-Ed., The Best-Laid Plan; Too Bad It Flopped, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
11, 2005, at 414 (arguing that the "government managed to fail at every level" in response to
Hurricane Katrina); Christopher Lee & Anushka Asthana, Damage and Doubts Linger After
Katrina; Study Cites Wide Skepticism of U.S. Readiness for This Year's Hurricane Season, WASH.
POST, Aug. 21, 2006, at A13 (stating that seventy percent of those surveyed said most individuals
still have not gotten the help they need with housing, health care and restoring their lives; fifty-
six percent said that the federal government has not done enough to help state and local
governments restore services in the affected areas; and fifty-three percent said that the
government's handling of the hurricane had a negative impact on their confidence in government
overall); Adam Nossiter, In the Trail of the Storm: Little Is Left But Stillness, N.Y. TIMES, June
15, 2006, at A16 (quoting one Katrina victim's experience of the devastation of the hurricanes: "I
lost everything, man.").
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In December 2006, Susette Kelo, the named plaintiff in Kelo,
sent holiday cards demonstrating that compensation is only one
reason why people resist government takings by eminent domain.
Although Kelo had recently accepted a $442,155 settlement for her
home, which was more than $300,000 above its appraised value, she
sent messages of ill will to city officials and members of New London's
development agency.1 26 One recipient of Kelo's card remarked, "It's
amazing anyone could be so vindictive when they've made so much
money."1 27 That recipient, like Heller, held the apparently misguided
belief that eminent domain holdouts care primarily about
compensation. For Kelo and others, money does not alleviate the ill
will the taking generates. Nonetheless, although he overlooked some
of the reasons for it, Heller correctly predicted that citizens would
resist a direct attempt by government to overcome the tragedy of the
anticommons through the exercise of eminent domain.' 28 This
resistance became law in Louisiana through the amendment to its
statement constitution that negated the impact of Kelo.
2. Markets are Not a Solution to the Tragedy in Louisiana
Markets likely never offered a viable solution to the tragedy in
Louisiana. Heller stated that a society trying to overcome an existing
tragedy of the anticommons faces difficulties that usually preclude
markets from serving as a solution, including high transaction
costs. 129 In Heller's examples, the storefronts in Moscow continue to
suffer because transaction costs prevent the private consolidation of
property rights. Conversely, street kiosks overcame the tragedy
through illegal markets because kiosk operators faced only minimal
transaction costs.1
30
Although the street kiosk example proves that it is possible to
overcome the tragedy of the anticommons through markets, the
situation in New Orleans likely does not lend itself to this solution.
The New Orleans situation more closely resembles the situation of the
storefront owners than that of the kiosk operators. The kiosk
operators overcame the tragedy by buying off the local mafia and a few
126. Woman's Christmas Wish: 'May You Rot in Hell,'ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 21, 2006, at
A2 ("Susette Kelo's unmerry greeting features a snowy image of her pink house and a message
that reads, in part: 'Your houses, your homes, your family, your friends. May they live in misery
that never ends. I curse you all. May you rot in hell. To each of you I send this spell.' ").
127. Id. -
128. Heller, supra note 2, at 679.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 643.
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local officials: all easily identifiable and locatable parties. 131 On the
other hand, the storefront owners have not overcome the tragedy
because consolidating rights through markets would require them to
bargain with countless parties, both private and public, located
throughout the country. 132 In New Orleans, identifying those with
whom one must bargain to consolidate rights through the property
records should be manageable. 133 Locating those individuals, however,
will not be easy. Unlike the mafia and officials in the kiosk example,
many of New Orleans's property owners no longer live on or near their
property. Additionally, most of those displaced by the storm left
unexpectedly and without planning, leaving no indication of their
intended destinations. As with the storefront owners, those in New
Orleans seeking to overcome the tragedy of the anticommons and put
property to its full use must locate individuals who reside throughout
the country. In many cases, the transaction costs involved in the
location effort alone would be monumental. Add the costs of
bargaining with an irrational owner over property that may be one of
the only things the owner has left to her name, and it becomes evident
that those looking to spark growth in New Orleans cannot rely on
markets to overcome the tragedy of the anticommons.
In sum, Heller accurately forecasted many of the difficulties
that prevent societies from overcoming an existing tragedy of the
anticommons. Because New Orleans cannot overcome the tragedy by
either of Heller's proposed methods, the city must resort to unexplored
measures if it hopes to fulfill President Bush's promise of being
"rebuilt ... even better and stronger than before the storm. 134
131. Id.
132. Id. at 655.
133. See Fred A. Bernstein, The New Orleans Market is Poised to Recover, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
13, 2005, at 9 (reporting that although property records were unavailable for months after the
storm, they are once again available, and the real estate market in New Orleans has exploded
over the past year); see also Steve Ritea, Nearly 50 New Orleans Public Schools Devastated,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Nov. 20, 2005, at 1 (describing the situation that has forced
schools to go to City Hall and carefully scrutinize the property records, many of which incurred
water damage during Katrina and were sent to Massachusetts to be freeze-dried); Greg Thomas,
Flooded Property Records Can Be Saved, Official Says; And They'll Be Moved From Court
Basement, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Sept. 13, 2005, at A3 ("Stored in the courthouse
basement, which took on nearly a foot of water during Hurricane Katrina, moisture was the
biggest enemy to property records. Abstractors, who conduct title searches before a real estate
transaction closes, should have access to them within the next few weeks .... ").
134. Address to the Nation on Hurricane Katrina Recovery From New Orleans, Louisiana, 40
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1405, 1407 (Sept. 19, 2005).
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IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The previous section of this Note explained that, acting alone,
neither governments nor markets offer a viable solution to New
Orleans's tragedy of the anticommons. Governments are unable to
overcome the tragedy through direct involvement (usually by
exercising their eminent domain power) for a multitude of reasons,
including public resistance. 135 Similarly, individuals struggle to
overcome the tragedy through markets because transaction costs
prevent efficient bargaining. 136
Because neither governments nor individuals can overcome the
tragedy acting alone, they must join forces to spark growth in New
Orleans. While people may resist unilateral government action, it is
less likely that they would resist indirect government involvement
aimed at enabling private individuals to overcome the problem of
under-used property. Nothing seems to prevent governments from
enabling individuals to overcome the tragedy by mitigating the factors
that deter individuals from acting voluntarily. If governments
minimized the transaction costs that prevent efficient bargaining
among individuals, New Orleans could successfully overcome the
tragedy of the anticommons created by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Such an effort may well prove necessary to avoid further economic
deterioration in the city. Three potential means that could be
implemented independently or in some combination to overcome the
tragedy are: shortening the statutory period required for adverse
possession from thirty years to five or ten years, raising property
taxes, or, conversely, lowering property taxes.
Importantly, the solutions offered in this Note facilitate the
bundling of rights by consolidating property belonging only to those
landowners who expressly agree to sell their property or have left New
Orleans and have no intention of coming back in the near future.
Although all anticommons result in the under-use of property,
economic efficiency alone does not constitute a legitimate reason to
oust people from their property. It is unreasonable to ask people who
have suffered through the devastation accompanying these storms to
sacrifice their homes and businesses for the benefit of society.
Admittedly, these are desperate times in the suffering city; however,
depriving people of the property on which they live and work ignores
135. Heller, supra note 2, at 679.
136. See id. at 625-26 ("Neither [a commons nor an anticommons] would be tragic in a
theoretical world of costless transactions, because people could trade their initial endowments
until resources were put to their highest-valued uses. . . . [In practice], however, efficient
bargains fail because transaction costs, strategic behaviors, and cognitive biases defeat informal
negotiations, and communities of owners are not close-knit.").
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many of our nation's core values. This is undoubtedly part of the
reason that the government's attempt to oust people from their homes
in Kelo met such resistance both locally and nationally. In an attempt
to avoid such outrage and resistance, this Note offers solutions that
would allow the tragedy to be overcome by enabling the consolidation
of rights in abandoned properties and in properties that current
residents are willing to sell.
A. Adjusting the Adverse Possession Statutory Requirement
Adjusting the time requirement for adverse possession is likely
the most effective potential solution to the tragedy of the anticommons
in New Orleans. Reducing the time requirement from thirty years137 to
five or ten years would make adverse possession easier for potential
owners and would exclude properties on which people still lived and
worked. Such a change would provide stronger incentives for
developers to use abandoned properties and thus represents an
example of indirect government involvement that enables individuals
to overcome the tragedy. Because an adverse possessor acquires a full
bundle of rights in the adversely possessed property, the former owner
can no longer exclude her. Therefore, the adverse possessor can use
her newly acquired property to its full potential. If the legislature is
worried about implementing such a drastic change, it could include a
sunset clause that would automatically revert Louisiana to the longer
requirement after a sufficient amount of time had passed for New
Orleans to regain economic momentum.
The common law allows an adverse possessor to gain title to
land that belongs to another if that possessor maintains possession
that is (1) actual and exclusive, (2) open and notorious, (3) hostile and
adverse, (4) continuous, and (5) for the required statutory period. 138
Courts and scholars rationalize the doctrine of adverse possession as
economically efficient by noting that it transfers property from an
owner not using the property to one who has used it in its intended
manner for an extended period of time. 139 This Note focuses on the
"statutory period" requirement of adverse possession. 140 Because this
137. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 742 (2006). See infra text accompanying notes 141-44 for a full
description of the adverse possession statute.
138. E.g., Chaplin v. Sanders, 676 P.2d 431, 434 (Wash. 1984).
139. E.g., Devins v. Borough of Bogota, 592 A.2d 199, 202 (N.J. 1991) ("[A]Uowing adverse
possession promotes active and efficient use of land." (citing RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 70-71 (3d ed. 1986); Netter, Hersch & Manson, An Economic Analysis of
Adverse Possession Statutes, 6 INT'L REV. OF L. & ECON. 217, 219 (1986))).
140. Courts treat the other factors differently, and a detailed analysis is irrelevant to and
beyond the scope of this article. Briefly, the test for adverse possession is the following:
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Note has analyzed the situation in New Orleans, this section
contemplates potential changes to the adverse possession system as it
currently exists in Louisiana.
141
Civil Code Article 742 governs the statutory period in
Louisiana. 142 To gain legal title to a piece of property, a possessor must
meet the various adverse possession requirements for ten years if the
she possessed in good faith, or for thirty years if otherwise.1 43 Courts
have held that a possessor possesses in good faith if the she has "just
reason to believe h[er]self the master of the thing which [s]he
possesses, although [s]he may not be in fact."1 44 Conversely, a "bad
To establish title by adverse possession, [an adverse possessor] must usually prove
that her possession was actual, hostile, open and notorious, exclusive, and
continuous for the period of the statute of limitations. Color of title and payment of
taxes can also be elements in some cases. The requirement that ... possession be
"actual" means that [an adverse possessor] must occupy or use the property as it
would be used by a true or undisputed owner. "Hostile" possession means, at a
minimum, that [an adverse possessor's] possession is not derived from [the rightful
owner's], as it would be if, for example, [the adverse possessor] were [the rightful
owner's] tenant .... For possession to be "open and notorious," [an adverse
possessor's] actions must be visible to others, either the neighbors or a diligent
owner. For... possession to be "exclusive," [an adverse possessor] cannot share
possession with the true owner. Because one of the key attributes of ownership is the
right to exclude others, [an adverse possessor] must act as a true owner would act,
exercising the right to exclude when appropriate. [P]ossession is "continuous" if [an
adverse possessor] does not abandon the land and no one else interrupts her
possession. Occasional use may be continuous if a true owner would use the property
in such a manner.
Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2423-24
(2001).
141. Louisiana law on adverse possession is similar to that of most other U.S. jurisdictions:
Most common law jurisdictions also provide for the acquisition of ownership of real
estate by "adverse possession." The acts of possession required by common law
statutes are comparable to those acts required under Louisiana law. Possession must
be adequate to notify the owner of the acts of dominion exercised over the property.
Furthermore, as in Louisiana, the extent of the acts necessary to establish adverse
possession is determined by the nature of the property. The duration of the
possession required to acquire ownership by adverse possession depends upon the
specific applicable legislative enactments. This period varies greatly between
jurisdictions; it is generally between five and twenty years. Some states provide, as
does Louisiana, for shorter periods of possession if the possessor holds the property
under color of title. Regardless of the statutory period, possession must be adverse
and continuous for the entire statutory period.
Andrew Rinker, Jr., The Civil Code Articles on Establishment of Boundary, 56 TUL. L. REV. 370,
386 (1981).
142. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 742 (2006); see Warren M. Schultz, Jr., Property-Possessory
Action-Plaintiff Must Clearly Manifest Intent to Possess as Owner, 49 TUL. L. REV. 1173, 1175
("Louisiana courts have held that the possession necessary to support the possessory action is
identical with that necessary for thirty-year acquisitive prescription.").
143. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 742.
144. Bd. of Comm'rs v. S.D. Hunter Found., 354 So. 2d 156, 160 (La. 1977).
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faith" possessor has "knowledge that [s]he ha[s] no title or that h[er]
title is defective."'
145
Applying the relevant civil code articles to the current situation
in New Orleans, a developer attempting to overcome the tragedy of
the anticommons by consolidating property rights belonging to
evacuees would likely never qualify as a good-faith possessor. As such,
the thirty-year statutory period would govern. To overcome the
tragedy of the anticommons in New Orleans under the law as it
currently stands, an entrepreneur attempting to acquire property by
adverse possession would have to meet the various adverse possession
requirements for thirty years.
The current thirty-year statutory requirement makes it
difficult for individuals to overcome the tragedy of the anticommons by
adverse possession. The stringent common law requirements, such as
continuous possession, are difficult to meet for thirty years. Allowing
such a lengthy time period in which the current landowner can
"break" the adverse possessor's possession makes it almost impossible
for the possessor to obtain rights to the property. Instead, the current
owner of the smaller parcel will maintain and exercise her
exclusionary right, causing the larger plot to go under-used and, in
New Orleans's case, undeveloped.
Additionally, even if the adverse possessor meets the common
law requirements for thirty years, places like New Orleans will suffer
from the tragedy for the three decades, during which time the owner
of the smaller parcel maintains her exclusionary right. Thus, although
individuals could overcome the tragedy of the anticommons by adverse
possession as the doctrine currently stands, a solution that
encouraged growth and development in the near future, rather than
thirty years down the road, would better serve the afflicted areas.
Shortening the statutory period would have positive effects on both
adverse possessors and current landowners, and it would help the
devastated city overcome the tragedy of the anticommons.
1. Shortening the Statutory Period would have Positive Effects on
Adverse Possessors
Shortening the statutory period would spark growth in the
hurricane-ravaged areas of New Orleans by making it possible for
individuals to consolidate rights without incurring overwhelmingly
high transaction costs. As described in the previous section, the
transaction costs facing private parties in New Orleans include those
associated with identifying and locating absent landowners and
145. Id.
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engaging them in efficient bargaining. Allowing individuals to
overcome the tragedy through adverse possession would eliminate all
such transaction costs, as there would no longer be any need to
identify, locate, or bargain with absent landowners. Admittedly,
adverse possessors would incur a new transaction cost in some cases,
as an adverse possessor often must seek a declaratory judgment
regarding her title to the property; however, this cost pales in
comparison to those associated with identification, location, and
bargaining. Although some developers might hesitate to adversely
possess property where it was uncertain whether the owner would
return, making adverse possession more attractive would serve the
city by allowing the consolidation of rights in clearly abandoned
properties, such as portions of the Ninth Ward where houses remain
both empty and uninhabitable.
Shortening the statutory period to five or ten years would have
several positive effects on entrepreneurs, the potential adverse
possessors in New Orleans. First, a shorter period would incentivize
entrepreneurs to put the abandoned properties to use in the first
place. Second, a shorter statutory requirement would allow adverse
possessors to overcome the tragedy of the anticommons in a shorter
period of time; thus, redevelopment could occur sooner.
2. Shortening the Statutory Period would have Positive Effects on
Current Landowners
A shortened statutory period could also help overcome the ill-
effects of the anticommons tragedy by positively affecting current
landowners who have evacuated New Orleans. As it is, a landowner
who has moved from the area and established herself in a new place
has little incentive to consider her property in New Orleans..
Shortening the adverse possession statutory period would force such
landowners to make property decisions much sooner than the current
law requires.
If landowners then decided to sell, developers would not have
to engage in the difficult process of identifying and locating the
current owners, as the current owners would seek out developers
willing to pay the highest price for their property. As such, individuals
could overcome the tragedy of the anticommons without encountering
at least two of the most significant transaction costs normally
associated with the market solution: identification and location. A
willing seller would also be much more likely to bargain efficiently
with a buyer than would an ambivalent or uninterested seller.
Similarly, if landowners decided not to sell their property in
New Orleans, a shorter statutory period would benefit the economy by
2007] 1627
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forcing those landowners either to move back to, or at least to visit
occassionally, the area to ensure that their property was not being
adversely possessed. Although neither of these outcomes would allow
consolidation of rights in these properties, in either case pieces of
property would not go wholly unused for as long as thirty years. At
least in the short term, New Orleans will benefit from any potential
economic boost, even such a minor one.
B. Other Partial Solutions
Because altering the adverse possession statutes would
eliminate almost all transaction costs, the solution represents the
most effective way that governments can use their power to enable
individuals to overcome the tragedy of the anticommons. Additionally,
or alternatively, local and state governments could target transaction
costs by other, more common measures. Unlike the adverse possession
solution, these partial solutions mostly target holdouts still living in
New Orleans, rather than evacuees who have not returned. As such,
combining them with the adverse possession solution would give New
Orleans its best chance to construct revenue-generating structures in
its mostly deserted areas. These are "partial" solutions because they
only reduce the transaction costs associated with individuals' attempts
to overcome the tragedy without the help of governments. Besides,
these solutions are most effective in a world of rational actors,
whereas the preceding analysis has shown that property owners tend
to act irrationally. 146 This Note offers two partial solutions: (1) raising
property taxes or, alternatively, (2) lowering property taxes. 147 Much
as with the adverse possession changes, the legislature could
accompany either tax action with a sunset clause if it thought doing so
would make its constituents more receptive. Throughout the city's
history, New Orleans residents have been particularly aware of and
sensitive to property tax rates.
1 48
146. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
147. While the possibility of a tax cut or hike targeted at abandoned properties alone is, in
theory, a plausible solution, the administrative burden of enforcing such a tax would be too
overwhelming for a government to impose it.
148. See LLOYD VOGT, NEW ORLEANS HOUSES: A HOUSE-WATCHER'S GUIDE 23 (1985)
(describing the camelback house, a popular home design in New Orleans, as a shotgun house
with one story in the front and two in the rear that may have developed because taxes were
levied on the basis of the height of the house along the streetfront, but not the rear).
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1. Raising Property Taxes
In theory, by raising property taxes, governments would
provide an incentive for current owners to use property or to sell it to
entrepreneurs who would use it efficiently. San Francisco used this
tactic to encourage growth following the earthquake of 1906.'
49
If they faced high property tax rates, rational property owners
that have evacuated and have no plans to return would feel pressure
to either sell or use their property. 150 Entrepreneurs, more willing to
pay such taxes because they intend to put the property to use, are
likely to acquire more property from willing sellers, avoiding the
tragedy of the anticommons by bundling rights into fewer owners who
can use the property to the social optimum. Alternatively, those
landowners who decide to use their property at least do not allow the
property to go completely forsaken. Additionally, in the short term,
increased taxes would provide the city with much needed revenue that
has been lost due to the tremendous decrease in residents.
51
In practice, however, raising property taxes likely will not
overcome the tragedy of the anticommons in New Orleans. First,
consolidation of rights would only necessarily follow if the current
landowners were rational actors motivated by monetary incentives-a
questionable premise in light of the endowment effect. 152 Second,
rational buyers would be less likely to offer as much for, and then buy,
large parcels of property if the government forces them to pay higher
taxes. Third, a government effort to raise taxes would have no effect
on several of the transaction costs facing buyers described in the
previous section, including the costs of identification and location of
current owners. 15 3 At best, the tax increase would encourage efficient
bargaining by penalizing those sellers who acted irrationally by
holding onto their land when offered a fair price. Fourth, citizens
would meet a government effort to further increase taxes in the
economically depressed area with considerable resistance. Given the
area's current financial difficulties, even finding a legislator to initiate
such an effort would prove a challenging task. These various
shortcomings imply that increasing taxes would likely be less effective
149. See Mason Gaffney, Repopulating New Orleans: How Did San Francisco Do What a Top
Economist Says New Orleans Cannot?, DOLLARS & SENSE, Mar./Apr. 2006, available at
http://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/2006/0306gaffney.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2007)
(explaining that the increase of the property tax rate in San Francisco following the 1906
earthquake caused each landowner to use his land).
150. Id.
151. See id. ("Mayor Nagin of New Orleans tells the world that Katrina wiped out most of his
tax base, so he is impotent.").
152. See supra text accompanying notes 124-27.
153. See supra Part 11I.C.2.
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in enabling individuals to overcome the tragedy of the anticommons
than would shortening the statutory requirement for adverse
possession.
2. Lowering Property Taxes
A legislative effort to lower property taxes would in theory
have the same positive effect of reducing the transaction costs
associated with bargaining. Rational actors contemplating whether or
not to buy a piece of property would willingly pay more on the front
end to acquire the property if they knew that they would pay less on
the back end in the way of property taxes. In theory, lowering taxes,
much like raising taxes, would encourage efficient bargaining because
a rational seller would be more likely to sell to a buyer who is willing
to pay more. By encouraging sale, lowering property taxes increases
the likelihood of efficient bargaining and thus the consolidation of
rights into one party's control.
In practice, however, this solution shares many faults with
raising property taxes and also would cause a different problem. First,
positive results would only necessarily follow if both parties were
rational actors, a premise that this Note discounts.154 Second, some
sellers would be less likely to sell pieces of property even if promised
higher prices if they know that they will face lower taxes in the future.
Essentially, lowering property taxes would prolong the tragedy by
decreasing the penalty on holdouts for holding onto their property.
Third, lowering taxes would have no effect on several of the more
significant transaction costs facing buyers, as described above. 155
Additionally, although finding political support for such a movement
would prove easier than finding it for an effort to raise taxes, this
solution would deprive the government of much needed tax revenues,
at least in the short term.
Because of the gravity of the situation in New Orleans and the
uncertainty associated with both raising and lowering property taxes,
governments trying to spark the economy would do best to shorten the
adverse possession statutory period. Rather than leaving the fate of
the city uncertain because of the irrationality of actors and the
numerous unmitigated transaction costs that accompany tax
adjustments, a decrease in the statutory period would almost certainly
ensure at least a minimal positive effect on the economy. Perhaps the
most effective solution involves combining a decrease in the statutory
period with an increase or decrease in taxes. The former would allow
154. See supra text accompanying notes 124-27.
155. See supra Part III.C.2.
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consolidation of rights in abandoned properties, and the latter would
make it possible for buyers to bargain more efficiently and consolidate
rights in both abandoned properties and properties on which citizens
still reside but wish to sell. Most importantly, because none of these
solutions ousts people unwillingly from their homes, the citizenry is
unlikely to protest.
V. CONCLUSION
The disasters that befell New Orleans during the hurricane
season of 2005 revealed the tragedy of the anticommons. Many areas
of the city remain undeveloped two years after Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita hit the coast. To date, homeowners' exclusionary rights have
prevented entrepreneurs from putting a given piece of property to use.
As with other anticommons tragedies, property continues to go under-
used or completely unused in the afflicted areas of the city.
Overcoming the tragedy requires a consolidation of property rights in
the hands of one owner so that she can redevelop the land to a socially
optimal level.
Because neither of Heller's proffered paths to consolidation is
available to New Orleans, the city must resort to unexplored measures
to overcome its tragedy. Transaction costs prevent individuals from
bundling rights themselves, precluding a purely market-driven
solution. Kelo gave government the power to eliminate exclusionary
rights through eminent domain, and eminent domain was considered
in areas such as the Ninth Ward in New Orleans, 156 but an
amendment to the state constitution passed in the fall of 2006 ended
any possibility of government using this power to bundle rights.
Because putting abandoned property to use is a key step in sparking
economic progress in New Orleans, the government must enable
individuals to overcome the tragedy by attacking the transaction costs
that individuals typically encounter in trying to consolidate rights by
themselves. This Note offers several suggestions as to how
government could do so. Although none is guaranteed to have the
desired effect, shortening the statutory period for adverse possession
appears to be New Orleans's best hope. Such indirect involvement by
government likely would not result in the same public outrage as did
the direct involvement at issue in Kelo. A general understanding of
the often forgotten anticommons theory by legislators represents the
key to the resurgence of the New Orleans economy.
156. Shaheen Pasha, Property Grabs and the Gulf, CNN/MONEY, Oct. 5, 2005, http://money.
cnn.com/2005/10/05/news/economy/eminent-domainkatrina/index.htm.
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